Flexibility versus stability: a difficult tradeoff in the Eurozone by Ji, Y & De Grauwe, P
March 2016(accepted version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility versus Stability:  
A difficult tradeoff in the Eurozone  
 
 
 
 
Paul De Grauwe 
London School of Economics 
 
Yuemei Ji 
University College London 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The optimal currency areas (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing 
eurozone countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour 
markets more flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for 
structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when 
shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When 
shocks are the result of business cycle movements, the way to deal with them is 
by stabilisation efforts. We provide empirical evidence that suggests that the 
biggest shocks in the eurozone were the result of business cycle movements. 
These were relatively well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue 
that efforts to stabilise the business cycles should be strengthened relative to the 
efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, and consider the 
implications for the governance of the eurozone. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, substantial efforts 
have been made to create a new form of governance for the eurozone that will 
make the monetary union more robust in absorbing future economic and 
financial shocks. Much of the drive to adapt the governance of the eurozone has 
been influenced by the traditional theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), which 
stresses the need for flexibility in product and labour markets. As a result, the 
eurozone countries have been pushed towards structural reforms that aim to 
reduce the structural rigidities in product and labour markets, in the hope that 
this would lead to a more resilient monetary union capable of withstanding 
future asymmetric shocks.  
Figure 1, which presents the OECD product market legislation index, shows that 
the eurozone countries have introduced structural reforms at a faster pace than 
the rest of the OECD countries.  Figure 2, which presents the OECD index of 
employment protection, shows how the eurozone has significantly reduced its 
tight employment protection, especially since the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. 
It is interesting to note that since the early 1990s the non-eurozone OECD 
countries have followed a reverse trend of increasing employment protection.  
In this paper we ask whether this movement towards structural reform as part 
of the push for new governance is really going in the right direction. We will 
argue that this is not the case. The main reason is that the nature of the shocks 
that have hit the eurozone does not correspond to the pattern of asymmetric 
shocks that has been identified by the OCA theory to require more flexibility. We 
will argue that what is needed in the eurozone is not more structural reforms but 
a better mechanism capable of dealing with the classical boom and bust 
dynamics that are inherent to capitalism. 
Hyman Minsky’s (1986) classic analysis of booms and busts in capitalist systems 
stresses the need to stabilise government mechanisms. We will ask whether the 
eurozone, which has moved towards more flexibility, provides for this stabilising 
mechanism.  
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In sections 2 and 3, we analyse what the OCA theory has to say about the need 
for flexibility and stabilisation in the face of asymmetric shocks. In section 4 we 
analyse empirically the nature of these shocks in the eurozone and in section 5 
we study what this evidence might means for the governance of the eurozone.   
 
Figure 1.  Product market legislation index 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
Figure 2. Employment protection legislation index 
 
Source: OECD. 
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2. Standard OCA theory and the governance of the eurozone 
The theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) has created a set of ideas that has an 
significant influence on the governance of the eurozone and on views about how 
this governance should be strengthened in the future.  The best way to make this 
clear is to present the core of the OCA theory, using a well-known graphical 
representation of this theory (see De Grauwe (2014)). This is done in Figure 3.  
On the horizontal axis we set out the degree of flexibility in the labour and goods 
markets. This measures the degree to which wages and prices adjust freely to 
shocks and the degree to which workers are mobile. We assume that these 
different dimensions of flexibility can be represented by one index. On the 
vertical axis we set out the degree of symmetry between countries, i.e. the degree 
of co-movement (correlation) of macroeconomic variables such as output and 
employment. Thus, when there are a lot of asymmetric shocks we move 
downwards along the vertical axis. By contrast, when shocks become less 
asymmetric we move upwards along the vertical axis.  
The downward sloping OCA line represents the trade-off between symmetry and 
flexibility. Hence, when the degree of symmetry declines (there are more 
asymmetric shocks) countries in a monetary union need more flexibility to deal 
with these shocks. The OCA-line separates the space into two zones. The OCA-
zone above the OCA-line contains the collection of points at which symmetry and 
flexibility are high enough to guarantee that the benefits of the monetary union 
exceed the costs. The points below the OCA-line are the points at which 
symmetry and flexibility are too low, i.e. countries located in that zone will find 
that the costs of the monetary union exceed the benefits. The OCA-line that 
separates the two zones can therefore also be defined as the collection of points 
for which the benefits and the costs of the monetary union are equal.  
This theory has been very influential for the governance of the eurozone and 
continues to be so. It is at the core of the policy prescriptions that call for 
structural reforms so as to make the labour and goods markets more flexible. In 
fact, since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 member countries have 
been pressured by the European Commission to introduce a whole set of 
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structural reforms. The member countries that turned to the eurozone for 
financial support (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) were given this support 
conditional on introducing a series of structural reforms that would make labour 
and goods markets more flexible. The underlying rationale was the OCA theory 
that stresses the need for flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks in a 
monetary union. 
 
Figure 3. OCA theory tradeoff between symmetry and flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the underlying assumptions of this theory and its prescription for 
flexibility is that the asymmetric shocks are permanent. When shocks are 
permanent, e.g. a change in preferences that leads consumers in one country to 
buy more of the foreign than of the domestic good, or a productivity increase in 
one but not in another country, then there is really no other way in a monetary 
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union to deal with such a shock other than changing relative prices (wages or 
product prices) or by a movement of labour and capital.  
Things are very different, however, when shocks are temporary. In that case, it 
can be argued that flexibility is not necessary. In fact it can even be harmful. Take 
the case of business cycle movements. When these are asymmetric, i.e. when 
they are not synchronised, it makes little sense to adjust by relative price 
changes and/or by movements of labour and capital. Flexibility may in fact 
exacerbate the business cycle movements and its asymmetry. For example, if 
country A experiences a recession and country B a boom the movement of labour 
from A to B is likely to exacerbate the recession in country A and the boom in 
country B.  Or take flexibility of wages. If during the recession country A is forced 
to reduce wages, the immediate effect of the wage cuts will be a decline in 
aggregate demand, which will make the recession in country A more severe. 
From the preceding analysis it follows that temporary shocks, such as business 
cycle movements, should be dealt with differently, i.e. by stabilisation efforts that 
smooth consumption over time.   
However, the OCA theory that focuses on the trade-off between flexibility and 
symmetry was developed on the assumption that asymmetric shocks are 
permanent. These shocks are also typically exogenous, like meteor impacts. 
There is nothing one can do about these. One is forced to adjust by making the 
system more flexible.  
Business cycle shocks, by contrast, can be said to be endogenous. They are the 
result of endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism that lead to booms 
and busts. These movements have been endemic in capitalism and will continue 
to do their work also in a monetary union. They have been described by Minsky 
(1986) and Kindleberger (2001). To the extent that these movements are not 
synchronised, they do not call for more flexibility; rather they call for insurance 
mechanisms that allow countries experiencing a downturn to be compensated by 
countries that experience a boom, in such a way that when the fortunes of 
countries are reversed the transfers are reversed.  
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It has long been recognised that such an insurance mechanism requires some 
form of budgetary union. Thus, endogenous and asymmetric business cycle 
movements call for very different institutions in the union from the permanent 
and exogenous shocks that have been at the core of the OCA analysis.  
 
3. Governance of a monetary union in the face of temporary shocks 
In this section we consider what the nature of the institutions of a monetary 
union should be when the shocks are endogenous, temporary and asymmetric. 
We will focus on business cycle movements that are driven by ‘animal spirits’, i.e. 
movements of optimism and pessimism that lead to booms during periods of 
optimism and recessions during periods of pessimism. In this section we focus 
on the theory. In the next section we analyse the empirical question of the nature 
of the asymmetric shocks in the eurozone.  
We start from a similar tradeoff to the one in Figure 3, but now we concentrate 
on the tradeoff between flexibility and budgetary union. A budgetary union 
should be seen as an insurance mechanism that allows countries experiencing 
bad economic times to be compensated by countries that fare well.  
The way this tradeoff is constructed is as follows (Figure 4). On the vertical axis 
we set out the degree of budgetary union. The higher the degree of budgetary 
union the more we move upwards along the vertical line. On the horizontal axis 
we set out the same measure of flexibility as that used in figure 3. The OCAS line 
now measures the minimum combinations of budgetary union and flexibility 
needed to make a monetary union economically attractive (higher benefits than 
costs).  It is negatively sloped for the following reason. When budgetary union 
increases, insurance against asymmetric shocks increases, making monetary 
union less costly. As a result, there is less need for flexibility. We move upward 
along the negatively sloped OCAS line.1 
This is an important insight. Flexibility may sound great for many economists 
and central bankers, but it is costly for those people who are forced to be flexible. 
                                                        
1 We call this tradeoff the OCAs line because the idea of such a tradeoff comes from 
André Sapir (2015). 
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Flexibility means that these people may have to accept a wage cut or be forced to 
emigrate. We learn from Figure 4 that a movement towards budgetary union 
alleviates the (painful) need to be flexible. It may also make a monetary union 
more acceptable to large segments of the population. 
 
Figure 4. Tradeoff between budgetary union and flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can use the insights of Figure 4 to analyse the importance of the nature of the 
asymmetric shocks. We have made the distinction between asymmetric shocks 
that are exogenous and permanent, and asymmetric shocks that are temporary 
and endogenous. We have argued that when a permanent (exogenous) shock 
occurs flexibility is the only option to adjust to this shock. By contrast, when 
business cycle movements are desynchronised it is not optimal to use flexibility. 
In that case an insurance mechanism is the appropriate way to govern the 
monetary union. A budgetary union provides this.  
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It can now be shown that the nature of the shocks influences the slope of the 
tradeoff.2 When the shocks are mainly of the permanent type, we obtain a steep 
tradeoff. We show this in Figure 5. We have also put the eurozone of 19 members 
below the OCAS-line, suggesting that the present eurozone is not an optimal 
currency area. The steep tradeoff implies that a small increase in flexibility leads 
us quicker into the OCA zone than a budgetary union. In the most extreme case, 
i.e. when all shocks are of a permanent nature, the tradeoff becomes vertical. In 
that case no amount of budgetary union will bring us into the OCA-zone. There is 
then no other way but to increase flexibility.  
 
Figure 5. How to move the eurozone towards the OCAS-area when 
permanent shocks dominate? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 We are grateful to Frank Vandenbroucke for suggesting that the nature of the 
shocks  affects the slope of the tradeoff.  
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Things are very different when the shocks are temporary, driven by business 
cycle movements. In that case the tradeoff is flat (Figure 6). As a result, much 
flexibility is needed to move the eurozone into the OCA area compared to 
budgetary union. A relatively small increase in budgetary union will bring us into 
the OCA-zone. In the most extreme case, i.e. when all shocks are of a temporary 
nature,, the tradeoff is horizontal. In that case no amount of flexibility will 
succeed in bringing the eurozone into the OCA-zone. The only way to achieve 
optimality will be through a budgetary union.  
 
Figure 6. How to move the eurozone towards the OCAS-area when business 
cycle movements dominate? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One complication that arises here has to do with hysteresis. Sometimes 
temporary shocks can lead to hysteresis effects. For example, a recession 
typically leads to plant closures and dismissal of workers. To the extent that 
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these workers have developed firm specific skills that are lost when the firm 
disappears, the workers lose part of their human capital making it difficult to 
find another (comparable) job. Unemployment can then become protracted. 
Another example relates to the nature of the boom. If, as was the case in Ireland 
and Spain, the boom is concentrated in the housing market, many workers are 
attracted to this sector during the boom. After the crash they are dismissed. They 
may find it difficult to use their skills acquired in the housing market in other 
sectors of the economy. There is a large literature on sources of hysteresis (See   
Blanchard, et al.(1986),  Ball(2009), Fatas and Summers(2015)). 
The existence of hysteresis has implications for our discussion. It implies that if a 
business cycle shock occurs it matters a great deal to try to use stabilization so as 
to avoid hysteresis effects.  If temporary business cycle shocks have permanent 
effects the need to set up schemes that will mitigate the impact of these shocks 
becomes even more important.  
Figures 5 and 6 lead to another interesting insight. Flexibility in labour markets 
is something national governments can do. There is no need for further 
integration to increase flexibility. Budgetary union, however, is of a different 
nature. It requires political integration. In other words, while flexibility is in the 
realm of national governments, budgetary union is a European affair (Sapir 
(2015)). Thus, when shocks are permanent they have to be dealt with at the 
national level while when shocks are temporary the response should be at the 
level of the eurozone.   
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4. The nature of shocks in the eurozone: empirical evidence 
 
It is not always easy to separate permanent from temporary shocks in economic 
time series. Here we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) that allows us to estimate 
the long-term trend component in GDP. The cyclical component is obtained by 
subtracting the trend component from the observed GDP3 (for more detail, see 
appendix, where we also analyse the robustness of the results for changes in the 
smoothness parameter lambda in the HP filter).  
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 7. We present, for each eurozone 
country,4 trend growth and the observed growth rates (the cyclical component is 
obtained by subtracting the observed from the trend growth).  Two results stand 
out. First, we observe for all eurozone countries (except for Germany) a decline 
in the long-term growth rate of GDP. This decline is particularly significant in 
Greece, Ireland, Finland, Spain, Portugal and Italy. Second, there is great 
variability in the business cycle (temporary) component of GDP growth. In order 
to gauge the relative importance of cyclical and trend components in GDP growth 
we compare the mean (absolute)5 cyclical growth of GDP with the (absolute) 
mean trend growth of GDP for each country. We show the results in Table 1. We 
observe that for the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) the cyclical growth and trend growth components are of similar 
magnitudes, although the cyclical component is systematically larger than the 
trend component. In the countries of the periphery (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, and Greece) this is very different. We observe that for these countries the 
cyclical growth component is much larger than the trend growth component (the 
most extreme case being observed for Greece). Thus, in the peripheral countries 
the GDP growth rates have been dominated by cyclical movements in economic 
activity of the boom-bust type.  
 
                                                        
3 There is a literature based on Blanchard and Quah (1989) that is based on estimating a 
VAR and, after imposing identifying restrictions, is able to estimate the temporary and 
the permanent component in output shocks. We discuss this literature in section 5. 
4 We only include the original eurozone countries. The new eurozone countries entered 
too late to provide a sufficiently long time series.  
5 As the cyclical component alternates between positive and negative numbers we have 
to take the absolute values.   
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Figure 7. Cyclical and trend components in GDP growth (1999-2014)
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Sources: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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Table 1. Mean (absolute) trend growth and mean 
(absolute) business cycle change in GDP  
(in percent) during 1999-2014 
  
Mean 
cycle 
Mean 
trend ratio 
        
Austria 1,79% 1,77% 1,01 
Belgium 1,72% 1,67% 1,03 
Germany 1,55% 1,23% 1,26 
France 2,15% 1,49% 1,44 
Netherlands  2,66% 1,66% 1,60 
Finland 4,35% 2,02% 2,15 
Spain 4,58% 2,07% 2,21 
Ireland 8,01% 3,35% 2,39 
Portugal 3,67% 0,81% 4,53 
Italy 2,86% 0,41% 7,05 
Greece 9,09% 0,90% 10,11 
 
   
Source: Computations based on data from Eurostat. 
 
 
What are the implications of these results? First, since the start of the eurozone, 
cyclical (temporary) movements have been the dominant factor behind growth 
variations in GDP. This is especially the case in those peripheral countries where 
cyclical movements in economic growth are many times higher than the long-
term growth rates. Thus, as mentioned earlier, booms and bust in economic 
activity seems to be the overwhelming characteristic of movements in GDP in the 
countries of the periphery.  
Second, it appears that the cyclical movements of GDP are highly correlated in 
the eurozone. This is made clear by Table 2, which shows the correlations in the 
cyclical components of GDP growth across the eurozone. We observe high 
correlation coefficients of bilateral cyclical components of GDP growth, typically 
0.8 or more. It is interesting to note that the country with the lowest correlation 
coefficients is Germany (although the German correlation coefficients are all 
positive). Thus, one can conclude that the business cycles of the eurozone 
countries were highly correlated. Germany stands out as the country with the 
lowest (positive) correlations of its business cycle with the rest of the eurozone.   
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients of cyclical components of GDP growth 
                      
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherl Port 
Austria 
         
  
Belgium 0,97 
        
  
Finland 0,97 0,98 
       
  
France 0,93 0,95 0,97 
      
  
Germany 0,69 0,57 0,55 0,59 
     
  
Greece 0,73 0,82 0,84 0,74 0,09 
    
  
Ireland 0,85 0,89 0,92 0,95 0,41 0,81 
   
  
Italy 0,91 0,96 0,98 0,96 0,50 0,86 0,93 
  
  
Netherlands 0,93 0,94 0,93 0,91 0,60 0,75 0,86 0,90 
 
  
Portugal 0,98 0,89 0,89 0,87 0,37 0,82 0,87 0,90 0,94   
Spain 0,85 0,91 0,94 0,87 0,27 0,97 0,90 0,95 0,86 0,90 
                      
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
Thus, the asymmetry between the eurozone countries is to be found not so much 
in a lack of correlation in business cycle movements but in the intensity of the 
boom-bust dynamics of growth rates. Put differently, eurozone countries’ 
business cycles seem to have been relatively well correlated. The difference 
between these countries was that some (mainly in the periphery) experienced 
much higher variance in business-cycle fluctuations than others (in the core). As 
a result, the asymmetry between member countries is to be found in the variance 
of the business cycles. This feature is striking in Figure 8, which shows the 
movements of the business-cycle components in the different eurozone 
countries. These appear to move together but are of very different amplitude. 
Some countries like Ireland and Spain experience a very strong boom and later 
bust, while countries like Belgium, Austria and Germany experience similar 
cycles but of much less amplitude.  
In order to obtain a more precise estimate of the asymmetry in the amplitudes of 
the business cycles, we regressed each country’s domestic cyclical component on 
the eurozone common cyclical component. The estimated slope coefficients 
reveal the extent to which the domestic cycles are smaller or lower in amplitude 
than the common cycle. The estimated slope coefficients are presented in Table 3. 
It is striking to find how different these slope coefficients are. Germany, Belgium, 
Austria and France have slope coefficients that are significantly lower than 1, 
suggesting cycles of significantly lower amplitude than the euro-cycle. 
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Conversely, Finland, Spain, and especially Ireland and Greece, have slope 
coefficients significantly higher than 1.  This suggests that these countries 
experienced much higher amplitudes in their business cycles than the common 
euro-cycle.  
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
 
Table 3. Slope of regression domestic cycle on euro-cycle 
  slope 
Germany 0,21 
Belgium 0,48 
Austria 0,49 
France 0,55 
Italy  0,77 
Netherlands 0,80 
Portugal 1,02 
Finland 1,21 
Spain 1,22 
Ireland 2,07 
Greece 2,18 
    
   Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 9 shows another aspect of this asymmetry. We present the standard 
deviations (across countries) of the cyclical components of GDP growth and 
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observe a striking pattern.  During the boom years 1999-2007 the standard 
deviation increases significantly. At the start of the financial crisis in 2008 the 
standard deviations decline but pick up again in 2011. This evidence suggests 
that during the boom years between 1999 and 2007 the asymmetry in the 
amplitude of the business cycle increased significantly until the crash, when it 
declined dramatically. In other words, the crash was almost as intensive again. 
Things changed with the sovereign debt crisis, which had the effect of 
introducing an increasing divergence in the amplitude of the cycle.  This result is 
also confirmed by Allard, et al. (2013), who find that growth divergence has 
continued to be high and in fact increased during the second half of the 2000s. 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
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Figure 9. Standard deviation cyclical component
 19 
correlated with the other countries’ demand and supply shocks, or with an 
estimate of the eurozone-wide demand and supply shocks.  The latter procedure 
was applied by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2002). We show their results in Table 3.  
It is striking to find how low the correlation coefficients are. In fact they are so 
low that most are not significantly different from zero.   
Table 4. 
Correlation of demand shocks 
    
Austria 0,08 
Belgium 0 
Finland 0,06 
France 0,3 
Germany 0,18 
Greece -0,01 
Ireland 0,13 
Italy 0,57 
Netherlands 0,04 
Portugal  0,09 
Spain 0,16 
    
Source: Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2002). 
Such a result should not really be surprising. In the Blanchard & Quah (1989) 
procedure a structural VAR is used on macroeconomic variables such as output 
and prices. This means that in the first step all endogenous relations between 
these variables is taken out. What is left over is the exogenous noise (the 
exogenous chocks) in these variables. By introducing identifying restrictions this 
procedure then finally allows us to interpret part of this exogenous noise to 
come from aggregate demand and part from aggregate supply. This exogenous 
noise appears to be rather small compared to the movements generated by the 
endogenous dynamics of booms and busts. It is therefore not really surprising 
that this procedure leads to low and mostly insignificant correlations across 
countries.  
The Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) approach (which is based on the 
Blanchard & Quah (1989) procedure is very much influenced by the standard 
OCA literature. As argued earlier, the latter has focused on exogenous shocks and 
how these are correlated across countries. It is clear that by eliminating the 
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endogenous boom and bust cycles from the statistical analysis one obtains a very 
shallow view on the nature of the asymmetry of shocks in the eurozone. Our 
procedure does not have this drawback and allows us to obtain a better view on 
how intensely the eurozone business cycles are connected.  
To conclude this and the previous section we would like to stress two limitations 
of our empirical analysis. First, our analysis has been based on the first 15 years 
of the eurozone. This period saw massive boom-bust dynamics. The boom in a 
number of peripheral countries can be said to have been influenced by the start 
of the eurozone, which led to strong declines in the real interest rates in these 
countries. Surely, the future will look different. Yet, as capitalism has been a 
story of booms and busts, one should expect that these dynamics will come back, 
albeit triggered by other events.  
Second, the fact that we find overwhelming evidence for the existence of 
temporary business cycle movements does not make the classical OCA shocks 
irrelevant. These will also occur regularly. The case of Finland illustrates this. 
This country recently experienced a classical OCA shock, necessitating an 
internal devaluation. When these shocks occur there will be a need for flexibility.       
 
6. Implications for the governance of the eurozone 
The findings reported in the previous sections put the need for stabilisation in 
the eurozone in a new light. We analyse two implications that involve steps 
towards fiscal integration.  
First, the finding of the overwhelming importance of the cyclical and temporary 
component of output growth should lead to the conclusion that efforts to 
stabilise the business cycle should be strengthened relative to the efforts that 
have been made to impose structural reforms. In terms of our theoretical 
analysis this means that Figure 6 is probably the relevant one. Again, this does 
not mean that flexibility can be disposed of.  
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6.1 Common unemployment insurance 
A second implication of our empirical results relates to the many proposals made 
to create a fiscal space at the eurozone level in the form of a common 
unemployment insurance system (see e.g. Van Rompuy, et al.(2012), the so-
called “Four Presidents report”, Enderlein, et al. (2012), Beblavy, et al. (2015)). 
The proposals for such an insurance system have very much been influenced by 
the standard assumption made in the OCA-theory that shocks are asymmetric, i.e. 
that when one country experiences a recession, and thus increasing 
unemployment, the other country experiences a boom, and declining 
unemployment. This facilitates the workings of the common unemployment 
insurance system. The booming country transfers resources to the country in a 
recession and thereby smoothes the business cycles in the two countries. 
Technically and politically such a system encounters relatively few problems.  
Problems may arise when, as we have found, business cycles are relatively well 
synchronised but of very different amplitude in the different member countries. 
In that case most countries will tend to experience a recession at about the same 
time; in some countries the recession will be mild but in others very intense. This 
creates both an economic and a political problem. First, countries with a mild 
recession are asked to transfer resources to countries experiencing a stronger 
recession. This tends to reduce the intensity of the recession in the latter country 
at the expense of making it more intense in the former country. It is not clear 
that this improves welfare. Second, it is likely to create important political 
problems in the former country that is asked to transfer resources when the 
economy is not doing well.  
Another way to formulate the previous insights is the following. The traditional 
proposals for a eurozone unemployment insurance mechanism are predicated 
on the view that there is a need to smooth differences in unemployment changes 
across countries. That is, it is assumed that some countries experience increases 
others declines in unemployment. The insurance mechanism then smoothes 
these inter-country differences. We have noted, however, that this is not a typical 
eurozone asymmetry. What we found is that most countries are likely to 
experience a boom and a recession at about the same time, with different 
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intensities and amplitudes. There is therefore relatively little need for inter-
country smoothing of business cycle movements. The more pressing need is to 
smooth volatilities over time.  
The previous analysis suggests that common unemployment insurance schemes 
should put emphasis on smoothing over time and not so much on inter-country 
smoothing. This can be achieved by allowing the common unemployment 
insurance scheme to accumulate deficits and surpluses over time. The fiscal rule 
that could be imposed is that the insurance scheme balances over the business 
cycle. Beblavy and Maselli (2014) have performed interesting simulations of 
several schemes that impose such a fiscal rule. In general it appears from these 
simulations that such an insurance mechanism can be implemented. Such a rule 
would make it possible to automatically balance the need for inter-country and 
inter-temporal smoothing. 
 
6.2 National stabilisation? 
In principle, inter-temporal smoothing could be done at the national level, by 
allowing the national budgets to do the job. However, the large differences in the 
amplitude of business-cycle movements makes such a purely national approach 
problematic, as it leads to large differences in the budget deficits and debt 
accumulation between countries. These differences quickly spill over into 
financial markets when countries that are hit very hard by a downward 
movement in output are subjected to sudden stops and liquidity crises (see De 
Grauwe (2011)). This is likely to force them to switch off the automatic 
stabilisers in their national budgets (De Grauwe and Ji (2012). As we argued, 
there this can push countries into a bad equilibrium.  
Put differently, in the absence of a budgetary union, large differences in the 
amplitude of the business cycles are likely to hit the countries experiencing the 
more severe recession by “sudden stops”, i.e. by large liquidity outflows that 
force them to abandon any ambition to stabilise the business cycle shocks. In 
addition, these liquidity outflows are inflows in some other countries in the 
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monetary union, typically those that are least hit by the recession.6 Their 
economic conditions improve at the expense of the others. The stabilisation of 
common business shocks with different amplitudes at the national level makes 
the system unstable.  
In this respect the research of Alcidi and Thirion (2015) is relevant. These 
authors find that while the core eurozone countries have been able to stabilise 
part (about 50%) of the business-cycle shocks at the national level since the 
eruption of the debt crisis in 2010, the peripheral countries have been unable to 
do so, and also unable to profit from insurance mechanisms at the level of the 
eurozone. As a result, most (90%) of the business-cycle shocks had to be 
absorbed by drops in consumption (and therefore in employment).  
National stabilisation efforts do not work but introduce an element of instability 
into a monetary union, mainly because they leave the countries most hit by the 
business-cycle shocks unable to stabilise. Thus, when business-cycle shocks 
dominate (as we have shown in the previous section) it will be necessary to 
follow a common approach to the stabilisation of the business cycles. This can 
only be provided by a budgetary union. By centralising part of the national 
budgets into a common budget managed by a common political authority, the 
different increases in budget deficits following from a (common) recession 
translate into a budget deficit at the union level. As a result, the destabilising 
flows of liquidity between countries disappear, and the common budgetary 
authority can allow the automatic stabilisers in the budget to do their role in 
smoothing the business cycle. In fact, because a common budget also generates 
implicit inter-country transfers the countries with the deepest recession will 
profit from the automatic stabilising features of the common budget most. As a 
result, a common budget provided the most effective way to stabilise the 
business cycle.   
It is clear, however, that a budgetary union in which a significant part of national 
taxation and spending is transferred to a European government and parliament 
                                                        
6 This is confirmed by the empirical work of Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) and 
Hoffmann and Nitschka (2012) who find that during recessions risk sharing 
through financial markets declines dramatically. 
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is far off. It cannot, therefore, be invoked today to solve the lack of stabilisation at 
the European level.  
In addition, the common insurance mechanisms now being proposed (see 
Beblavy and Maselli (2014)) have a relatively small inter-temporal smoothing 
component, amounting to no more than 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP over the business 
cycle, certainly insufficient to produce a significant inter-temporal smoothing at 
the EU-level. Fortunately, there are possibilities to enhance stabilisation at the 
eurozone level that do not require a full budgetary union. 
 
6.3 A stabilisation fund 
Here is a scheme that can provide some stabilisation at the eurozone level. A 
stabilisation fund would be set up. This could in fact be the existing European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). During recessions, the ESM would buy national 
government bonds and issue an equivalent amount of ESM-bonds (Eurobonds) 
backed by the participating member-countries.  During booms the EMS would do 
the opposite, i.e. buy back the ESM-bonds and sell the national bonds into the 
bond markets. In doing so, there would be no net accumulation of ESM-bonds 
over the business cycle.  
How does this scheme contribute to stabilisation at the eurozone level? During 
recessions national budget deficits increase automatically. Put differently, 
national governments have to issue new government bonds. We have argued 
that this process is likely to lead to destabilising capital flows, as some countries’ 
recessions are deeper than others. This leads to more bond issues in the 
countries hit by the deepest recessions than in the countries experiencing mild 
recessions. The bond-buying operations by the ESM would then tend to support 
the government bond markets in the eurozone in general, but at the same time 
the support would be strongest in the government bond markets of the countries 
experiencing the deepest recessions. As a result, the EMS-buying operations 
would tend to unify the government bond markets and would reduce the scope 
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for destabilising capital flows within the eurozone. This would be a significant 
achievement.7 
There are many technical issues to be solved here. In particular, in order to avoid 
a net accumulation of EMS-bonds over the business cycle, the EMS would only be 
allowed to buy bonds corresponding to the cyclical component of the 
government budget. This makes the computation of reliable structural 
government balances imperative.  
 
7. EMU and long-term growth 
We argued that there are too few institutions in the eurozone to perform the 
necessary stabilisation responsibilities of a monetary union. It is clear from our 
previous analysis that there is also a long-term growth problem in the eurozone. 
This is made obvious in Table 5. This shows the estimated long-term growth 
rates in 1995 and in 2014 in the eurozone countries. These are obtained from 
the same Hodrick-Prescott procedure used in the previous sections. We observe 
that there has been a significant decline of the trend growth in all countries. Note 
that this has been observed in most developed countries (see Summers (2014) 
and Teugels and Baldwin(2014)). 
Conventional policy-maker wisdom in the EU is that the low and declining long-
term growth in the eurozone is due to a lack of flexibility in product and labour 
markets. As a result of this wisdom, countries have been pushed towards 
introducing structural reform programmes. We showed the evidence in Figures 
1 and 2. Yet all the enthusiasm for introducing flexibility in product and labour 
markets has borne little fruit in terms of boosting economic growth in the 
eurozone. In fact, declining long-term economic growth has been correlated with 
increasing flexibility. In Appendix II we present an econometric analysis of the 
relation between long-term economic growth and flexibility of labour and 
                                                        
7 The proposed stabilisation fund resembles the proposal made by Drèze and 
Durré (2012).  The Drèze & Durré proposal, however, is a pure inter-country 
insurance mechanism insisting that the fund balance its books at each moment in 
time.  Note also that the scheme proposed here is very different from the OMT-
programme of the ECB that is intended to be used in times of crisis. In addition, 
OMT is conditional on austerity programmes and tends to be procyclical. 
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product markets. We conclude from that analysis that the evidence of a positive 
correlation between growth and flexibility is weak (see also IMF (2015)). 
  
Table 5. Estimates of long-term growth rates in eurozone in 1995 and 2014 
  
Trend 
1995 
Trend 
2014 Change 
        
Austria 2,05% 1,62% -0,42% 
Belgium 1,95% 1,52% -0,43% 
Finland 2,76% 1,64% -1,12% 
France 1,84% 1,32% -0,52% 
Germany 1,31% 1,20% -0,12% 
Greece 2,19% 0,10% -2,09% 
Ireland 4,74% 2,71% -2,03% 
Italy 0,87% 0,15% -0,72% 
Netherlands 2,17% 1,42% -0,75% 
Portugal 1,50% 0,47% -1,03% 
Spain 2,81% 1,65% -1,15% 
        
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
Since the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, member countries have been 
pushed towards introducing more flexibility into labour and product markets. 
This drive towards structural reforms was very much influenced by the 
traditional theory of optimal currency areas (OCA). This theory stresses that in 
the face of asymmetric shocks member countries should have a sufficient degree 
of labour and product market flexibility to adjust to these shocks. Without such 
flexibility adjustment will be impossible, thereby undermining the sustainability 
of the monetary union.  
The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that 
asymmetric shocks are permanent (e.g. permanent changes in preferences or 
productivity shocks). When the shocks are temporary it does not follow that 
more flexibility is the answer. More specifically, when the shocks are the result of 
unsynchronised business cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by 
stabilisation efforts.  
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In this paper we have provided empirical evidence to suggest that the most 
significant shocks in the eurozone have been the result of boom and bust, driven 
by waves of optimism and pessimism. These business-cycle movements have 
been relatively well-synchronised. What was not synchronised was the 
amplitude of these business-cycle movements, where some countries 
experienced much greater amplitude in business cycles than others. 
In principle, these business-cycle movements could be stabilised at the national 
level without the need for budgetary union. However, as the amplitude of these 
movements is so different, countries experiencing the deepest recession are 
likely to be hit by ‘sudden stops’, i.e. liquidity outflows triggered by fear and 
panic, which forces them to switch off the automatic stabilisers in the budget, 
preventing them from conducting any stabilisation.  
We argued that the best possible way to deal with the business-cycle movements 
whose amplitude is unsynchronised is by introducing a budgetary union. By 
centralising part of the national budgets into a common budget managed by a 
common political authority, the various increases in budget deficits following 
from a (common) recession translate into a budget deficit at the union level. As a 
result, the destabilising flows of liquidity between countries during the recession 
disappear, and the common budgetary authority can allow the automatic 
stabiliser in the common budget to perform its role in smoothing the business 
cycle. 
It is highly unlikely that the governance of the eurozone will move in the 
direction of creating institutions capable of providing the necessary stabilisation 
of booms and busts that national governments are no longer able to provide. The 
willingness to move in this direction is minimal. Thus, one has to look for 
schemes that introduce some stabilisation at the eurozone level without going all 
the way towards budgetary union. 
We discussed two schemes that have a potential for stabilisation at the eurozone 
level. One is a common unemployment insurance scheme that puts more 
emphasis on inter-temporal insurance and less on inter-country insurance. The 
second scheme consists of using the ESM as a stabiliser of national government 
bond markets. It would buy national government bonds and issue ESM bonds 
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during recession and do the opposite during an economic boom, making sure 
that over the business cycle there would be no net issue of ESM bonds. We 
argued that this would make it possible to stabilise the government bond 
markets during a recession, thereby avoiding a destabilisation of capital flows 
within the eurozone.  
We also argued that the new governance of the eurozone that is based on 
imposing structural reforms does not solve the stabilisation problem that arises 
from the fact that most asymmetric shocks in the eurozone originate in booms 
and busts in economic activity.  
This new governance focus on structural reforms is also unlikely to boost long-
term growth. As we have shown in this paper, structural reforms have an 
negligible effect on long-term growth. The paradox is that the austerity 
programmes followed in the eurozone have reduced public investment 
dramatically and have thereby eliminated one of the most important channels to 
long-term economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
As suggested in the main text, the choice of the smoothing parameter (lamda) in 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter has a significant influence on the estimate of the 
cyclical and permanent components of GDP-growth. In this appendix we 
illustrate this by comparing estimates, using a high and a low lamda. The high 
lamda is the same as the one used in the text and was set equal to 1200; the low 
lamda was set equal to 100. We compare the results in Figure A1. It is 
immediately evident that in the low lamda estimates the long-term growth line 
follows the observed output growth line more closely. As a result, the cyclical 
component is on average smaller than in the high lamda case. This is made clear 
in Table A1, which shows the mean absolute changes in the trend and cyclical 
components. Even in the case of a low lamda we find that the peripheral 
countries have been subjected to larger cyclical than permanent movements in 
output.  
Table A2 presents the correlation coefficients of the cyclical components of GDP 
growth for low lamda. It should be compared with Table 2 in the text. We 
observe that in the low lamda estimates the correlation coefficients are of a 
similar order of magnitude as in the high lamda case. Thus, one of our main 
conclusions, i.e. that business cycles have been highly correlated, is maintained. 
This is also made clear in Figure A2 that shows the evolution of the business 
cycle component in the two estimates. Obviously, in the low lamda estimate the 
business cycle components are generally lower than in the high lamda estimate. 
In both cases, though, we observe similarly correlated booms and busts in the 
eurozone. And, as Figure A3 indicates, the divergence in the amplitude of the 
business cycles across countries tends to increase during the boom years prior to 
the crisis. This is also what we found using estimates with a high lamda. Thus, 
one of our major empirical conclusions still stands, even when one uses a low 
lamda. This is that the asymmetry in the business cycles of the eurozone 
countries is to be found in the divergence in the amplitude of the business cycle. 
The business cycles themselves tended to be highly correlated.   
There is reason to believe that the low lamda estimates bias the business cycle 
components downwards and thus the long-term growth component upwards (in 
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absolute value). This is made clear from Table A3, which compares the estimates 
of long-term growth in 1995 and 2014 in the two lamda scenarios. We find that 
in the low lamda estimates the decline in long-term growth in a number of 
periphery countries is implausibly high. In the cases of Ireland and Greece long-
term growth declines by more than 7 percentage points. (The corresponding 
declines in the high lamda case is 2%.)  
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Figure A1. Observed and trend growth of GDP 
 
 High lamda(Figure 7)    Low Lamda 
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Table A1 
Low lamda 
  
Mean 
cycle 
Mean 
trend ratio 
        
Belgium 0,97% 1,47% 0,66 
Austria 1,18% 1,58% 0,75 
Spain 1,69% 2,22% 0,76 
France 1,04% 1,27% 0,82 
Portugal 1,63% 1,40% 1,16 
Netherlands  1,61% 1,33% 1,21 
Germany 1,49% 1,18% 1,27 
Ireland 3,26% 2,48% 1,31 
Finland 2,08% 1,53% 1,36 
Italy 1,37% 0,96% 1,42 
Greece 4,50% 2,85% 1,58 
        
High lamda (Table 1) 
  
Mean 
cycle 
Mean 
trend ratio 
        
Austria 1,79% 1,77% 1,01 
Belgium 1,72% 1,67% 1,03 
Germany 1,55% 1,23% 1,26 
France 2,15% 1,49% 1,44 
Netherlands  2,66% 1,66% 1,60 
Finland 4,35% 2,02% 2,15 
Spain 4,58% 2,07% 2,21 
Ireland 8,01% 3,35% 2,39 
Portugal 3,67% 0,81% 4,53 
Italy 2,86% 0,41% 7,05 
Greece 9,09% 0,90% 10,11 
 
 
Table A2. Correlation coefficients of business components of GDP growth 
Low lamda 
                      
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherl Port 
Austria 
         
  
Belgium 0,95 
        
  
Finland 0,96 0,96 
       
  
France 0,91 0,91 0,93 
      
  
Germany 0,86 0,77 0,79 0,84 
     
  
Greece 0,37 0,48 0,51 0,27 -0,01 
    
  
Ireland 0,73 0,75 0,79 0,85 0,59 0,45 
   
  
Italy 0,84 0,89 0,94 0,90 0,74 0,53 0,78 
  
  
Netherlands 0,88 0,86 0,84 0,79 0,78 0,36 0,64 0,74 
 
  
Portugal 0,92 0,71 0,65 0,58 0,51 0,46 0,50 0,65 0,85   
Spain 0,68 0,75 0,79 0,62 0,37 0,90 0,70 0,82 0,64 0,65 
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Figure A2 
 
Low lamda 
 
 
High lamda (Figure 8) 
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Figure A3 
Low lamda 
 
 
 
Table A3. Estimates of long term growth in 1995 and 2014 
Low lamda 
  
Trend 
1995 
Trend 
2014 Change 
        
Austria 2,58% 1,02% -1,56% 
Belgium 2,49% 0,90% -1,59% 
Finland 4,20% 0,09% -4,11% 
France 2,53% 0,69% -1,84% 
Germany 1,55% 1,11% -0,43% 
Greece 4,12% -3,37% -7,49% 
Ireland 7,66% 0,41% -7,26% 
Italy 1,71% -0,86% -2,57% 
Netherlands 3,27% 0,45% -2,83% 
Portugal 2,98% -0,87% -3,85% 
Spain 3,99% -0,14% -4,13% 
        
 
High lamda (Table 5) 
  
Trend 
1995 
Trend 
2014 Change 
        
Austria 2,05% 1,62% -0,42% 
Belgium 1,95% 1,52% -0,43% 
Finland 2,76% 1,64% -1,12% 
France 1,84% 1,32% -0,52% 
Germany 1,31% 1,20% -0,12% 
Greece 2,19% 0,10% -2,09% 
Ireland 4,74% 2,71% -2,03% 
Italy 0,87% 0,15% -0,72% 
Netherlands 2,17% 1,42% -0,75% 
Portugal 1,50% 0,47% -1,03% 
Spain 2,81% 1,65% -1,15% 
        
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
Standard deviation cyclical 
component
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APPENDIX 2 
Econometric analysis of the relation between growth and flexibility 
 
In order to find out how labour and product market flexibility affect economic 
growth, we performed an econometric analysis identifying the variables that can 
affect economic growth. The traditional theory of economic growth has 
identified a number of fundamental variables that drive the economic growth 
process. These variables are population growth, physical and human capital 
accumulation and technological progress (the residual in Solow’s growth model). 
Recent theoretical contributions have highlighted the importance of institutions 
as deep variables that influence the process of capital accumulation and 
technological progress (productivity growth). Influential contributions are Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).  
There are many institutional features that can influence the economic growth 
process. The econometric literature has put a lot of emphasis on political 
institutions (nature of democracy, transparency of political system, rule of law, 
etc.) that affect the dynamics of physical and human capital accumulation and 
technological progress, and through this channel economic growth. The 
flexibility of labour and capital markets (or the lack thereof) is part of the 
institutional characteristics of countries that can affect economic growth.  
In this section we present the results of estimating an econometric growth model 
using indicators of the degree of flexibility in labour and product markets (as 
measured by the OECD) as one of the institutions that can facilitate capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. The analysis is based on De Grauwe and 
Ji (2015).  
The study is limited in that it focuses on flexibility in labour and product markets 
and not the many other institutions that have been identified in the econometric 
growth literature (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Acemoglu (2009)). 
One institutional feature we introduce in the analysis is the quality of public 
governance. We use the World Bank’s index of government effectiveness. Our 
study is limited in another sense. We restrict our econometric analysis to OECD 
countries. The main reason is that the indices of labour and output market 
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flexibility that we are interested in have been constructed by the OECD for the 
OECD-member countries. 
One must also take into account that reverse causality may be at work and bias 
the results. This reverse causality runs as follows. In countries with high growth, 
there is a high demand for labour protection. Workers and their representatives 
are strong and are pushing for legislation to provide strong employment 
protection. As a result, we will observe that high growth is correlated with a lot 
of employment protection. This is in fact what we find when applying an OLS 
estimator in a model explaining growth by employment protection (see De 
Grauwe and Ji (2015)). 
In order to correct for this reverse causality, we used an instrumental variable 
method. We selected two instruments. One is the lagged index of employment 
protection (EPL), the other is the ideological composition of the government 
along the scale right to left. This takes the view that employment protection is 
positively correlated with the ideological composition of governments, i.e. more 
leftist governments push for more employment protection. The results of this 
instrumental variable estimation are presented in Table 4.   
We find that investment in physical and human capital has the expected positive 
and significant effects on economic growth. Employment protection and product 
market regulations do not have a significant effect on economic growth. Note 
that similar results were found recently by IMF (2015).  By contrast, the World 
Bank index of government effectiveness has a significantly positive effect on 
economic growth, while government consumption (as a % of GDP) negatively 
affects economic growth.  
We conclude that the mainstream policy view that flexibility in labour and 
production is important to boost economic growth is not based on strong 
empirical evidence. The paradox is that the austerity programmes followed in 
the eurozone have reduced public investment dramatically and thereby have 
eliminated one of the most important channels that lead to long-term economic 
growth.  
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Table A4. Estimation of economic growth as a function of variables in first 
column 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
 Advanced 
economies  
1985-2013 
OECD 
economies 
1998-2013 
OECD 
economies 
1998-2013 
Advanced 
economies 
1998-2013 
Advanced 
economies 
1998-2013 
Second Stage:      
      
Investment GDP ratio 0.111 
(0.091) 
0.270** 
(0.129) 
0.339** 
(0.140) 
0.192** 
(0.095) 
0.257** 
(0.118)  
Tertiary education/total 
population 
1.798*** 
(0.148) 
1.492*** 
(0.160) 
1.464*** 
(0.138) 
1.456*** 
(0.147) 
1.429*** 
(0.127) 
 
Real effective exchange rate -0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.052*** 
(0.015)  
Working population growth -0.425 
(0.331) 
-0.776*** 
(0.299) 
-0.901*** 
(0.311) 
-0.658** 
(0.274) 
-0.792*** 
(0.290)  
Government consumption 
GDP ratio 
-0.670*** 
(0.148) 
-0.597*** 
(0.180) 
-0.535*** 
(0.165) 
-0.733*** 
(0.174) 
-0.666*** 
(0.154) 
 
Real retirement age 0.170 0.080 0.085 0.192 0.189 
 (0.148) (0.192) (0.189) (0.175) (0.173) 
Government effectiveness 0.737 
(1.019) 
1.016 
(0.961) 
0.766 
(0.932) 
0.829 
(0.991) 
0.528 
(0.946)  
Crisis -1.595*** -1.771*** -2.142*** -1.415*** -1.740*** 
 (0.286) (0.320) (0.406) (0.315) (0.378) 
Employment protection 1.936* 
(1.069) 
-1.267 
(2.484) 
-0.784 
(2.509) 
1.101 
(1.066) 
1.608 
(1.138)  
Product market regulation   -0.775 
(0.590) 
 -0.647 
(0.455) 
      
First Stage      
Excluded instruments:      
Lagged employment 
protection 
0.877*** 
(0.085) 
0.7893*** 
(0.0864) 
0.7728*** 
(0.0872) 
0.8660*** 
(0.0908) 
0.8365*** 
(0.093) 
Government (left) 
composition 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0004** 
(0.002) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0003  
(0.002) 
Partial R-squared of 
excluded instruments 
0.6065 0.5387 0.5217 0.5720 0.5432 
Weak Identification F test 0.0064 0.0068 0.0061 0.0064 0.0075 
Hansen J statistic 0.7150 0.8469 0.8589 0.6875 0.7408 
      
Observations 389 405 399 347 341 
R-squared 0.464 0.387 0.404 0.452 0.473 
Number of countries 23 28 28 23 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Advanced economy: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US 
Regression: fixed effect module 
 
